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Trade and the Environment in the WTO
Steve Charnovitz*

ABSTRACT
The linkage between trade and the environment stands out as an important challenge in global
economic governance. Over the past decade, the WTO devoted considerable attention to this issue
and included it on the agenda of the Doha Round. In parallel, the jurisprudence on trade and the
environment has experienced significant advances. This study provides an overview of the main
institutional changes at the WTO and of the developments in the jurisprudence most relevant to the
interaction between the environment and trade. Specifically, this study focuses on GATT Article
XX and takes note of many positive (and a few negative) features of the key Appellate Body
decisions.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, an important period of reform has commenced in the interplay of trade and
the environment. The debate began about 80 years ago and can be capsulized briefly. The initial
debate occurred in the 1920s during the preparatory period for the first multilateral trade treaty, the
Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions. That Convention
contained an exception for trade restrictions imposed for the protection of public health and the
protection of animals and plants against diseases and against ‘extinction’.1 A generation later, the
debate was rekindled in the drafting of the Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO)
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The ITO Charter’s Commercial
*Faculty of Law, George Washington University, 2000 H Street, Washington, DC 20052.
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Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions, 8 November
1927, 97 League of Nation Treaty Series 391, Article 4, Ad Article 4, not in force.
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provisions contain a general exception for multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) in
addition to the general exceptions that parallel those in the contemporary GATT Article XX
(General Exceptions). The MEA exception of 1948 applies to measures ‘taken in pursuance of any
inter-governmental agreement which relates solely to the conservation of fisheries resources,
migratory birds or wild animals’, and which meets some additional conditions.2 The debate on
trade and the environment was revived in the early 1970s, and then became quiescent again. By the
late 1980s, the GATT had developed an inward-looking personality, and began to be perceived as
being unsympathetic to the challenges of protecting the environment. Emblematic of this
environmental insensitivity was the GATT Secretariat Report of 1992 on ‘Trade and the
Environment’ which proclaimed that ‘In principle, it is not possible under GATT’s rules to make
access to one’s own market dependent on the domestic environmental policies or practices of the
exporting country’.3 A new era in the trade-environment debate began in 1996–98. This era was
fostered by enlightened Appellate Body jurisprudence and boosted by the attention given to the
environment by trade negotiators in the waning days of the Uruguay Round.
This article calls the past decade a ‘reform’ period for the trading system not because of the
birth of a new solicitude for the environment, but rather because the earlier green fundamentals of
the trading system are now being respected. As will be seen below, the Appellate Body gave little
attention to the historic roots, preferring instead to formulate its environment-friendly holdings as
an ‘evolutionary’ approach to interpretation. Nevertheless, in my view, the dramatic change in
2

Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO Charter), 24 March 1948,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/prewto_legal_e.htm (visited 10 June 2007), Article
45(1)(a)(x), not in force. The three additional conditions for such an international agreement are:
(1) that it is not used to accomplish results inconsistent with the ITO Chapter on Intergovernmental
Commodity Control Agreements, (2) that it is not used to accomplish results inconsistent with the
purposes of the ITO Charter, and (3) that the agreement is given ‘full publicity’. Ibid, Articles
60(1)(e), 70(1)(d). Note that GATT Article XXIX:1 calls on parties to ‘undertake to observe to the
fullest extent of their executive authority the general principles ... of the Havana Charter’ ....
3

GATT Secretariat, International Trade 90–91, Vol. 1, 1992, 19–43 at 23.
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trade jurisprudence over the past decade is not evolutionary (and not revolutionary), but rather is
reformist in orientation.
For this Journal to take note of ‘trade and the environment’ in this anniversary issue is
appropriate indeed. Attention to the environment appeared in the first pages4 of this Journal, and
over the past ten years, the Journal has presented considerable cutting edge scholarship on this
linkage.5 The Journal has also run book reviews on this topic.6
The purpose of this article is to provide a brief survey of the past decade in the trade and
environment debate. The article proceeds in three parts: Part I examines the most significant
institutional developments at the WTO on trade and the environment. Part II examines
developments in WTO jurisprudence, focusing on GATT Article XX. Part III concludes.
I. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPENTS
To fast forward to the conclusion, the environment has now become a mainstream trade issue. That
transformation of the world trading system is to be commended. While it is still too early to declare
victory on the visionary calls of 14 years ago for ‘greening the GATT’,7 the progress made since

4

John H. Jackson, ‘Global Economics and International Economic Law, 1 Journal of International
Economic Law 1 (1998), at 3.
5

For example, Daniel C. Esty, ‘An Environmental Perspective on Seattle’, 3 Journal of International
Economic Law 176 (2000); David Vogel, ‘Environmental Regulation and Economic Integration’, 3
Journal of International Economic Law 265 (2000); Barbara Eggers and Ruth Mackenzie, ‘The
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety’, 3 Journal of International Economic Law 525 (2000); Andrew
Green, ‘Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO: How Constraining Are Trade Rules?’, 8
Journal of International Economic Law 143 (2005); Andrew Green and Tracey Epps, ‘The WTO,
Science and the Environment’, 10 Journal of International Economic Law 285 (2007).
6

For example, Kevin P. Gallagher, Review of Gary P. Sampson, The WTO and Sustainable
Development, 9 Journal of International Economic Law 511 (2006).
7

This was the title of the leading scholarly analysis: Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade,
Environment, and the Future (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1994). An even
earlier volume was Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst (eds), The Greening of World Trade
Issues (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).
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1994 has surely been greater than expected by the governments and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) who, in the early 1990s, called for a more environment-friendly trading system.8 Today,
there is considerable recognition of the public order contributions of the WTO, not just for the
world economy, but also for the global ecolonomy.
A. WTO Treaty Provisions on the Environment
In retrospect, some of the most important greening occurred in the new world trade constitution,
that is, the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement)
and its annexes. Let me briefly review those provisions. The Preamble to the WTO Agreement was
based on the Preamble to the GATT, but a small change was made. Whereas the GATT’s Preamble
recognizes that trade relations should be conducted with a view to listed objectives including
‘developing the full use of resources of the world...’, the WTO’s Preamble modifies this by
recognizing among the listed objectives, ‘allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the
environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective
needs and concerns at different levels of development’. At the time this addition was made, few
thought that such preambular language would have any future legal significance. Yet surprisingly it
did; in US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body relied upon the WTO Preamble to interpret the General
Exceptions in GATT Article XX.9 In subsequent years, this preambular language has often been
referred to by governments, WTO adjudicators, and WTO officials as justification for a stronger
8

Among those actors: the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries, the Talloires Group,
the Global Environment & Trade Study, the Foundation for International Environmental Law and
Development (FIELD), and WWF.
9

See John H. Jackson, ‘Justice Feliciano and the WTO Environmental Cases: Laying the
Foundations of a “Constitutional Jurisprudence” with Implications for Developing Countries’, in
Steve Charnovitz, Debra P. Steger and Peter van den Bossche (eds), Law in the Service of Human
Dignity. Essays in Honour of Florentino Feliciano (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
29–43 at 40.
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environmental dimension to the WTO. For example, in US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body stated
that the Preamble shows that WTO negotiators ‘decided to qualify the original objectives of the
GATT 1947’, and demonstrates a recognition by WTO negotiators that optimal use of the world’s
resources should be made in accordance with the objective of sustainable development’.10
Moreover, the Appellate Body declared that states ‘should’ protect the environment ‘either within
the WTO or in other international fora’.11 In the follow-on US – Shrimp litigation in 2001, the
compliance panel reached the conclusion that ‘sustainable development is one of the objectives of
the WTO Agreement’.12
All agreements in the WTO system supervise trade-related environmental measures
(TREMs),13 but within these agreements, there are a number of provisions that specifically address
the environment. Most of them were not part of the pre-WTO system. A brief catalogue follows:
The Agreement on Agriculture provides that certain payments for government environment
programs may have a qualified exemption from the Agreement’s required subsidy reduction
commitments.14 The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement) includes ‘ecological and environmental conditions’ within its criteria for a risk
assessment, and requires governments to consider ‘ecosystems’ as one factor in determining pest or
10

WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, paras. 152–53.
11

Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, above n 10, para. 185.

12

Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/RW, para. 5.54, adopted 21 November
2001, as upheld by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/RW. In my view, a WTO commitment
to sustainable development is a hollow victory for environmentalists because that term has been
stretched in a way so as to make it acceptable to all and meaningful for no one. For a good
discussion of ‘sustainable development’ today, see David G. Victor, ‘Recovering Sustainable
Development’, 85 Foreign Affairs, January/February 2006, 91.
13

For this analysis, I have adopted the TREM acronym invented in the early 1990s by Paul Demaret.
As used here, a TREM is an environmental measure that affects trade (e.g., a tax).
14

Agreement on Agriculture, Article 6.1, Annex II paras. 2(a), 8(a), 12.
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disease free areas.15 The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) recognizes
the protection of the environment as a legitimate objective.16 The Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) contains an environmental exception with regard to
patents. Members may exclude an invention from patentability when the prevention of domestic
commercial exploitation is necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid
serious prejudice to the environment.17 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM Agreement) provided non-actionable status for financial assistance from government to
industry to promote adaptation to new environmental requirements.18 Unfortunately, this provision
lapsed after five years, and the WTO failed to reinstitute this safe harbor. As a result, TREM
subsidies are now potentially outlawed by the WTO, including those which may be called for in
other WTO agreements.19 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) contains an
exception for measures ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’.20
During the past decade, as the WTO system has matured, some of the environmental
omissions in WTO law have become more evident. For example, the GATS, unlike the GATT,
does not contain a policy exception for conservation measures.21 The TBT Agreement lacks an
environmental exception to its requirement that measures accord national treatment, accord mostfavored-nation treatment (MFN), and ‘not be more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil a
15

SPS Agreement, Articles 5.2, 6.2.

16

TBT Agreement, Article 2.2

17

TRIPS Agreement, Article 27.2.

18

SCM Agreement, Article 8.2(c).

19

For example, Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement directs developed country WTO Members to
‘provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting
technology transfer to least-developed country Members’.

20

GATS Article XIV(b).

21

See Uruguay Round Decision on Trade in Services and the Environment.
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legitimate objective’.22 Another example is the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) which requires that panels adjudicating GATS disputes regarding
‘prudential issues and other financial matters’ have the necessary expertise to the specific financial
service under dispute.23 Yet the DSU lacks an analogous requirement for expertise in
environmental disputes.
Experience within the WTO system has also pointed to new possibilities for using WTO
rules to improve the environment. For example, the TBT Agreement requires the use of
international standards as a basis for technical regulations except when such standards would be ‘an
ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pursued...’.24 In
the EC – Sardines case, the WTO appellators gave this rule a broad scope by holding that even
voluntary, non-consensus standards qualified as ‘international standards’.25 The potentialities of
this discipline for upward environmental and health harmonization have barely begun to be
explored.26 The next section in Part I looks at organizational improvements within the WTO.
B. Organizational Developments
22

TBT Agreement, Articles 2.1, 2.2.

23

GATS Annex on Financial Services, para. 4; DSU Article 1.2 and Appendix 2.

24

TBT Agreement, Article 2.4.

25

WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines,
WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002, paras. 221–22. The term ‘international standard’ is
not defined in TBT. The Appellate Body rejected the EC’s contention that Article 2.4 of the TBT
Agreement does not apply to non-consensus standards. The Appellate Body’s explanation is
illogical, in my view, because it seems based on the proposition that a ‘standard’ in the TBT
Agreement can be a non-consensus document. That is obviously correct, but begs the question of
what an international standard is. The Appellate Body’s conclusion has rendered inutile the
sentence in the TBT definitions that ‘Standards prepared by the international standardization
community are based on consensus’.
26

Note, however, that the TBT Agreement proclaims that ‘developing country Members should not
be expected to use international standards as a basis for their technical regulations or standards . . .
which are not appropriate to their development, financial and trade needs’. TBT Agreement, Article
12.4.
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The Uruguay Round negotiators called for a WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE)
which was set up in 1995. The CTE’s achievements have been modest,27 most notably being a
symbol of the institutionalization of environment issues into WTO processes.28 In particular, the
Committee has served as a venue where national officials from trade and environment ministries
can meet together, and where representatives from some MEAs and the UN Environment
Programme can regularly meet with trade officials.29 The value of such mutual socialization should
not be underestimated.
In addition, the CTE has also commissioned from WTO staff a number of very useful
background papers which eventually are made publicly available. These background papers have
often been written by staff in the WTO Trade and Environment Division. Since the mid-1990s, this
Division has employed a number of talented staff who have made significant internal bureaucratic
and external scholarly contributions. In 1999, the WTO Secretariat published a Report on Trade
and Environment. That Report had some serious weaknesses,30 but was warmly greeted and
continues to be widely cited. The information disseminated on the WTO website about trade and
environment has been useful, especially because it is available to anyone in the world with an

27

One measure of its meager output can be seen in the Annual Report of the CTE. In 2006, 2005,
2004, and 2003, the Report for each year ran less than two full pages. The 2002 Report ran three
pages. Perhaps the best analysis of the CTE is Gregory C. Shaffer, ‘The Nexus of Law and Politics:
The WTO’s Committee on Trade and Environment’, in Richard H. Steinberg (ed), The Greening of
Trade Law (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002) 81–114.
28

The WTO Secretariat describes environment as a ‘horizontal’ issue. WTO Secretariat, ‘Trade and
Environment’, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_e.htm (visited 6 June 2007).
29

The CTE has not granted observer status to many international environmental organizations, for
example, the Montreal Protocol Secretariat, the International Labour Organizations, and the IUCN
which is a hybrid international organization.
30

Steve Charnovitz, ‘World Trade and the Environment: A Review of the New WTO Report’, 12
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 523 (2000).
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internet connection. In some instances, however, the Secretariat continues to disseminate incorrect
legal interpretations about TREMs, particularly process-related ones.31
From the early years of the WTO, on approximately an annual basis, the WTO Secretariat
has sponsored a Public Forum where civic society and private sector participants are invited to
attend, and gain an opportunity to interact with government officials and WTO bureaucrats.
Environmental concerns have been an important focus of these Forums which have also devoted
attention to developmental, trade and sometimes social issues. Such Public Forums, however, have
not significantly made up for the fact that even in its second decade, the WTO continues to resist
making arrangements, consistent with those in other major international organizations, for
consultation and cooperation with NGOs.
The WTO Secretariat is also responsible for writing reports for the Trade Policy Review
(TPR) process. Many TPRs do take note of some ecological factors. For example, the 2005 TPR on
Nigeria notes that Nigeria promotes environmentally friendly farming practices, an environmental
shrimp fisheries project, and has transport infrastructure policies seeking environmental
sustainability.32 On the other hand, the TPR notes that gas production leads to environmental
pollution.33
31

For example, the Secretariat opines:
Under existing GATT rules and jurisprudence, ‘product’ taxes and
charges can be adjusted at the border, but ‘process’ taxes and charges
by and large cannot. For example, a domestic tax on fuel can be
applied perfectly legitimately to imported fuel, but a tax on the energy
consumed in producing a ton of steel cannot be applied to imported
steel.

WTO Secretariat, ‘Trade and Environment at the WTO’, April 2004, at 21. In my view, no legal
authority exists for this proposition. and the Secretariat certainly offers no analysis of GATT
Articles II, III, or XX that would justify its conclusion.
32

WTO, ‘Trade Policy Review Nigeria’, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/xx147, 13 April
2005, at 55, 59, 80.

33

Ibid, at 66.
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Although it is true that the multilateral trade negotiating process at the WTO has performed
poorly since the mid-1990s, one brighter spot has been the 22 successful accession negotiations. So
far, these negotiations have not addressed environmental concerns in any significant way. The
accession negotiations routinely demand WTO-plus commitments from applicant countries, but the
WTO has not used its bargaining leverage to seek improvements in sustainable development.
The trade and environment debate has also had some broader impact. First,
environmentalists have influenced the trading system by exporting into it norms in favor of
organizational transparency. Although the trading system has always demanded transparency at the
national level, the GATT had a blind spot about its own lack of transparency. In my view, criticism
by environmentalists, other NGOs, and trade scholars was instrumental in the early 1990s in leading
trade bureaucrats to begin to open up the trading system.34 Today, the WTO website is among the
best in international organizations in providing synopses of activities and downloads of documents.
It was the environmental and consumer NGOs that first thought to send amicus curiae briefs to the
WTO, and these once quixotic efforts eventually led the Appellate Body to open the door to amicus
briefs. It was also environmentalists who first called for open trade panel hearings, and this was
recently tested at the WTO.35 Second, the trade and environment issue at the GATT/WTO has had
some systemic implications for the environment regime. The most important has been an
appreciation of the benefits to the trading system of the organizational strengthening that occurred
in the 1990s. This led some environmentalists (and some within the WTO) to call for a World
Environment Organization. The early 1990s debate on the trade-law status of environmental

34

For example, see John H. Jackson, ‘World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence
or Conflict?’, 49 Washington and Lee Law Review 1227 (1992), at 1255 (‘Nevertheless, the
environmentalists ... have several legitimate complaints about GATT dispute settlement procedures,
among others. First, they note appropriately that the GATT lacks a certain amount of
transparency.’)
35

See ‘WTO Opens “Hormones” Panel Proceedings to Public’, WTO News, 27 September 2006.
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treaties also led to the use of the acronym MEAs and the greater community identity of those
autonomous international entities. Today, MEAs are one issue being considered in the Doha
Round.
C. The Environmental Dimension of Trade Negotiations
The current round of multilateral trade negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda, was launched
in 2001, and the negotiations are ongoing as of June 2007. The Doha Agenda contains several
environmental elements which WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy has termed the ‘environmental
chapter’.36 It seems very likely that if the Doha Round is successfully brought to conclusion, the
results will include new environmental provisions. Among them may be needed disciplines for
fishery subsidies.37
The Doha Declaration sets out a negotiating agenda and a forward work program for the
WTO.38 Because the negotiations are a work in progress, I will not cover them here. It should be
noted, however, that the negotiating process is not being conducted with sufficient transparency,
and therefore, the interested public is not always able to appreciate what is going on so that public
opinion can be injected. For example, a recent paper by the Secretariat said to contain a reduced list
of environmental goods is classified in the JOB series which is not available the public.39
D. Competition with Preferential Trade Agreements

36

‘Lamy Urges Support for Environmental Chapter of the Doha Round’, WTO News, 5 February
2007.
37

For example, see Roman Grynberg, ‘WTO Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations: Implications for
ACP Fisheries Access Arrangements and Sustainable Management’, in Roman Grynberg (ed), WTO
at the Margins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 607–32.

38

These environmental objectives are reiterated in the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration,
WT/MIN(05)DEC, 22 December 2005, paras. 30-32.
39

See ‘CTE Update’, Bridges, May 2007, 8.
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The WTO is in competition with other fora in the negotiation of new trade liberalization. In
recent years, comparatively greater progress has been made in achieving liberalization in bilateral
and regional free trade agreements, also known as preferential trade agreements (PTAs). All PTAs
negotiated in the 2000s embrace numerous ‘trade-and’ issues beyond the rules now in the WTO.
Investment is the most common WTO-plus issue in PTAs.
Many PTAs have provisions regarding the environment. For example the China–Chile Free
Trade Agreement states that the parties ‘shall enhance their communication and cooperation on
labor, social security and environment...’.40 The Japan–Mexico Agreement devotes an article to
Cooperation in the Field of Environment.41 The PTAs negotiated by the United States all contain a
chapter on environment that commits parties to enforce their own environmental laws and provides
for dispute settlement should that not occur. These PTAs contain side agreements to effectuate
environmental cooperation and capacity building. The most recent development in the United
States is that after the 2006 elections, the new majority party (the Democrats) demanded stronger
environmental provisions in pending PTAs (e.g. Panama and Peru). The Bush Administration
agreed to such a plan which is now being formalized.42 Under this agreement, the pending PTAs
will require both parties to implement seven listed MEAs; the list was carefully selected to only
include MEAs that both parties had already ratified.

40

Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
Government of the Republic of Chile, 18 November 2005, Article 108,
http://www.sice.oas.org/tradee.asp#CHL_CHN (visited 6 June 2007).

41

Agreement between Japan and the United Mexican States for the Strengthening of the Economic
Partnership, 17 September 2004, Article 147,
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/JPN_MEXDraftEPA_e/JPN_MEXind_e.asp (visited 6 June 2007).
42

Sarah Lueck, John D. McKinnon and Greg Hitt, ‘Bush, Congress Agree
On Trade Standards’, Wall Street Journal, 11 May 2007, A2.
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The utilization of PTAs was given considerable discussion in the 2005 Report of the
Consultative Board to the WTO Director-General (Sutherland Commission).43 The Report seems to
criticize the ‘injection of particular “non-trade” objectives into [preferential] trade agreements’ such
as ‘significant labour and environmental protection undertakings’.44 The Report expresses a
concern that such requirements may not only be ‘templates’ for future PTAs, but also ‘forerunners
of new demands in the WTO’.45 In my view, the Board was correct in laying down the marker that
provisions used in PTAs are not necessarily appropriate for the WTO. The Board’s discussion on
this point is a bit cryptic, but I doubt that the Board meant to suggest that environmental provisions
should be left out of PTAs because their presence in PTAs could serve as a precedent for inclusion
in the WTO. Such a position would be untenable, in my view, because a bilateral or regional level
agreement might be an appropriate level for a mutual environmental commitment that would not
make as much sense in a multilateral agreement. To be sure, the Board is correct in questioning
whether a trade agreement is the optimal instrument for an environmental (or other non-trade)
commitment in the first place.46 Yet even if a trade agreement is not optimal, there may well be
domestic political or institutional reasons why trading partners may find it easier to gain
parliamentary approval for trade agreements than for environmental agreements. For example, in
the United States, the US Congress periodically makes available a fast track approval process for
international agreements on trade that is not available for international agreements on the
environment.
43

See ‘Mini-Symposium on the Consultative Board’s Report on the Future of the WTO’, 8 Journal
of International Economic Law 287 (2005).
44

‘The Future of the WTO, Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium,’ Report by
the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, January 2005, para. 87,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf (visited 6 June 2007).
45

Ibid, para. 87,

46

Ibid, para. 33.
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III. DEVELOPMENTS IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER GATT ARTICLE XX
Only three environmental disputes have been fully adjudicated at the WTO: US–Gasoline, US–
Shrimp, and EC–Asbestos.47 This caseload is less than what might have been expected given the
high-profile concerns of the early 1990s about environmental trade barriers. In the first two of these
cases, the challenged measure was found to be a WTO violation. In Gasoline, the US regulation
found to be a GATT violation was corrected. In Shrimp, the US import ban found to be a GATT
violation was corrected and then found to be in compliance by the DSU Article 21.5 panel and the
Appellate Body. In Asbestos, the French regulation was found to be consistent with WTO law. A
fourth case, Brazil – Tyres, was released as this article was finalized, and so will not be discussed
here.48
All of these cases pivoted to a large extent on GATT Article XX (General Exceptions), and
the adjudications turned around the reputation of world trade law as being insensitive to the
environment.49 Despite the fact that violations were found in two of the three cases, the generally
well-thought-out Appellate Body decisions inspired confidence in the adjudication process, and
convinced many environmentalists that legitimate environmental measures would be permitted by
the WTO. In all three original environmental cases, the decisions of the panels were flawed and the
47

In addition, there have been five disputes involving the SPS Agreement. Any SPS case is
concerned with threats to human, animal or plant life and health. If the SPS cases are counted as
environmental cases, then the environmental case load is considerably higher and the win/loss ratio
much lower. In all five of the SPS cases, the challenged measure was found to be a violation. Two
of those five cases had a DSU Article 21.5 panel that found continuing violations. For reasons of
space, this article will not discuss the SPS cases comprehensively, but will offer comments on
aspects of them.
48

Daniel Pruzin, ‘WTO Panel Backs EU in Ruling Against Brazil’s Import Ban on Retreaded Tires’,
BNA Daily Report for Executives, 13 June 2007, A-1. The panel ruled against Brazil’s claim for an
Article XX(b) exception.
49

See Carrie Wofford, ‘A Greener Future at the WTO: The Refinement of WTO Jurisprudence on
Environmental Exceptions to GATT’, 24 Harvard Environmental Law Review 563 (2000); Robert
Howse, ‘The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the
Trade and Environment Debate’, 27 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 491 (2002).
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Appellate Body had to reverse some of the central holdings. Although space considerations prevent
a comprehensive review of the Article XX caselaw, I will highlight the key holdings and related
jurisprudence.
An important development for Article XX was that the Appellate Body cast aside some of
the GATT and early WTO panel holdings that threatened to render the environmental exceptions
unusable. With the ostensible intention of saving the trading system,50 a series of panels had
fabricated illogical reasons as to why Article XX could not be used.51 Far from saving the
GATT/WTO, these holdings threatened the trading system by triggering worries as to its hostile
attitude toward the environment. By reversing the US – Gasoline, US – Shrimp, and EC – Asbestos
panels, the Appellate Body not only corrected errant holdings,52 but also sent a signal to the public
that the era of runaway panels on environmental matters was over.53 In EC – Asbestos, the
Appellate Body upheld the panel on Article XX, but reversed the panel’s holding regarding the
structural relationship between GATT Articles III and XX. The jurisprudence is now clearer that
Article III and XX ‘are distinct and independent provisions of the GATT 1994 each to be
50

See, e.g., GATT Panel Report, US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 39S/155, 1991, unadopted,
paras. 5.25, 5.27, 5.32; GATT Panel Report, US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R, 1994,
unadopted, paras. 5.26 (‘Under such an interpretation the General Agreement could no longer serve
as a multilateral framework for trade among contracting parties’), 5.38; Panel Report, US – Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, adopted 6 November 1998 as
modified by the Appellate Body Report, paras. 7.44 (holding that Article XX allow governments to
derogate from GATT provisions so long as ‘they do not undermine the WTO multilateral trading
system’), 7.60, 7.61. In perhaps its most brazen misleading statement, the Shrimp panel claims to
be basing its holding not only on WTO rules, but also on ‘international law’, and in that regard, the
panel refers to general international law and international environmental law. Ibid, para. 7.61.
51

See Steve Charnovitz, ‘GATT and the Environment: Examining the Issues’, 4 International
Environmental Affairs 203 (1992), at 211 (pointing out that ‘increasingly stringent tests are being
created by panels on an ad hoc basis’).
52

See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, above n. 10, para. 121 (criticizing the panel for an
interpretation that would render Article XX exception ‘inutile’).
53

The Presiding Member of the Appellate Body division in each of these three cases was Florentino
Feliciano, a point well appreciated by Professor Jackson in his contribution to the Feliciano
Festschrift, above n 9.
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interpreted on its own’.54 One hopes that this holding lays to rest the Appellate Body’s puzzling
statement in US – Gasoline that Article XX(g) ‘may not be read so expansively as seriously to
subvert the purpose and object of Article III:4’.55
In place of the convoluted Article XX jurisprudence of the past, the Appellate Body
resuscitated Article XX56 by establishing a multi-step framework for panels to evaluate Article XX
claims. For an Article XX(b) claim, a panel should begin the sequence of analysis by considering
whether the challenged measure fits within the scope of a particular paragraph in Article XX, and
whether the purported state interest in preventing a risk is genuine.57 Then the panel looks for the
required ‘degree of connection’ specified in the paragraph (e.g., ‘necessary’).58 The next step is to
further appraise the measure under the chapeau of Article XX, taking into account the particular
paragraph that provides a provisional justification. The Appellate Body grasped the internal logic of
Article XX that had eluded several panels of putting the chapeau to work to catch illegitimate
attempts to misuse an environmental exception.59
A. Paragraph (b) of Article XX
54

See WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, para. 115.
55

See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, at 18.
56

The Appellate Body noted that Article XX contains provisions to permit important state interests
‘to find expression’. Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, above n 55, at 29–30.
57

See Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, above n 54, paras. 157, 162.

58

Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, above n 55, at 18.

59

See Charnovitz (1992), above n 51, at 218 (noting that the Article XX chapeau had atrophied from
inattention and calling on panels to use the Article XX chapeau in environmental cases); Donald M.
McRae, ‘GATT Article XX and the WTO Appellate Body’, in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard
Quick (eds), New Directions in International Economic Law. Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 228–236, at 227 (noting that GATT panels ‘had paid
little attention to the chapeau’ and that under the WTO, ‘new life has been breathed into the
chapeau’).
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The challenge in adjudicating Article XX(b) has not been in identifying measures that actually fit
within that paragraph; rather, the challenge has been to show that a contested measure is
‘necessary’. As the Appellate Body explained in US – Gambling, this test is objective.60 (The
Appellate Body made this statement with reference to the GATS General Exceptions, but in doing
so, made clear that it was relying on its GATT Article XX doctrine.61) In EC – Asbestos, the
Appellate Body said that ‘it is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine the level
of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation’.62 Some scholars have
read this statement to mean that the Appellate Body ‘rejected categorically the notion that a
member’s right to determine its level of protection should be subject to considerations of
proportionality’.63
The method to be used in determining whether the challenged measure is ‘necessary’ (to
achieve its intended purpose) is difficult to outline succinctly because the jurisprudence is
confusing. A ‘necessary’ measure is significantly closer to the pole of being indispensable than to
the opposite pole of merely making a contribution to the policy goal. For measures that are not

60

See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2005, para. 304.
61

Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, ibid, paras. 291–92, 305. Given this symmetry, this
study will draw on Gambling because it provides the most elaborate exposition by the Appellate
Body of the General Exceptions.

62

WTO Appellate Body Report, above n. 54, para. 168. Relatedly, see WTO Appellate Body
Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R,
WT/DS48/AB, R, adopted 13 February 1998, para. 177 (taking cognizance of a right and ‘duty’ of
WTO Members to protect the life and health of their people).
63

For example, see Robert Howse and Elisabeth Türk, ‘The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations’,
in George A. Bermann and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds.) Trade and Human Health and Safety
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 77–117 at 113.
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indispensable to achieve the Article XX(b) objective,64 the ‘necessary’ standard is to be judged in
every case through a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors.65 The factors are openended, but should include: (1) the relative importance of the common interests or value pursued by
the measure, (2) the contribution made by the measure to the realization of the ends pursued by it,
and (3) the restrictive impact of the measure on international commerce.66 The defending
government bears the burden of putting forward evidence and arguments that enable a panel to
assess the measure in light of the relevant factors to be weighed and balanced in a given case.67 The
defending government does not have to show that its measure is better than all alternatives in order
to establish that its measure is necessary.68 If the complaining government points to an alternative

64

When a measure is indispensable to achieve the Article XX(b) goal, then presumably that measure
is deemed necessary. See Howse and Türk, ibid, at 114–15. Yet in their most recent judgment on
Article XX(d), in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, the Appellate Body said nothing about a special
category of indispensable measures. WTO Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft
Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, adopted 24 March 2006, paras. 66, 80.
65

WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen
Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, para. 164. This test was
applied to Article XX(b) in Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 172. The importation of
the Article XX(d) test to Article XX(b) has been criticized by some scholars. For example, see
Anupam Goyal, The WTO and International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006) 139–140.
66

Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, above n 60, para. 306.

67

Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, ibid, paras. 309, 310, 323. No case has yet occurred
where a measure itself has been judged on its own to fail this balancing test. One reading of the
jurisprudence is that the Appellate Body’s term ‘weighing and balancing’ is a misnomer, and what
is going on instead is that the measure in place is only weighed against a reasonable alternative
measure. This is the interpretation put forward by Don Regan, as I understand it, and he may well
be correct that the Appellate Body has not called for weighing adverse trade effects against other
values. In other words, in a hypothetical case, the Appellate Body would not demand that an
existing measure with 80 percent effectiveness and significant trade impact be replaced by a
reasonable alternative measure with 70 percent effectiveness and no trade impact. See Michael
Trebilcock and Michael Fishbein, ‘International Trade: Barriers to Trade’, in Andrew T. Guzman
and Alan O. Sykes, Research Handbook in International Economic Law (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, 2007) 1–61 at 45 (making a similar point).
68

Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, above n 60, paras. 309, 310, 320.
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measure that, in its view, the defendant government could have taken,69 then the defendant bears an
additional burden of showing that the measure it actually used remains necessary even in light of
that alternative, or in other words, why the proposed alternative is not, in fact, ‘reasonably
available.’70 The determination of whether the proposed alternative is reasonably available is also
accomplished through a balancing test by looking at the extent to which the alternative contributes
to the realization of the end pursued.71 If there is an alternative measure that achieves the same life
or health end and is ‘less restrictive of trade’, then the panel could find that the measure being used
is not necessary.72 In justifying its measure, a government may ‘rely in good faith, on scientific

69

The alternative measure has to enable to defendant government to achieve its desired level of
protection with respect to the objective pursued. Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, ibid, para.
308.
70

Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, ibid, para. 311.

71

Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, above n 54, para. 172. An alternative measure is not
reasonably available if it is merely theoretical in nature, imposes an undue burden on the regulating
government, or the regulating government is not capable of taking it. Appellate Body Report, US –
Gambling, above n 60, para. 311.
72

See Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, above n 54, para. 172 (last sentence). The Appellate
Body’s consideration of a trade restrictiveness factor in connection to a health measure was
noteworthy because (despite 15 years on scholarly commentary to the contrary) this was the first
GATT/WTO holding for Article XX(b) to do so. See GATT Panel Report, Thailand – Restrictions
on Importation of Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 37S/200, para. 75 (no mention of a less trade
restrictive test). The Thai Cigarette panel explained that Article XX(b) would ‘allow contracting
parties to impose trade restrictive measures inconsistent with the General Agreement to pursue
overriding public policy goals to the extent that such inconsistencies were unavoidable’. Ibid, para.
74. The panel further noted that Article XX(b) ‘clearly allowed contracting parties to give priority
to health over trade liberalization’. Ibid, para. 73. In my view, it was unfortunate that the Appellate
abandoned these principles and replaced them with a balancing test in which trade can trump health.
The Appellate Body does not explain why it did so, but the reason is probably that a traderestrictiveness test had been incorporated into the SPS Agreement (Article 5.6) and the TBT
Agreement (Articles 2.2, 2.3), and it is inevitable (and probably intended by trade negotiators) that
such norms would eventually be imported in GATT Article XX. For example, in the first SPS case,
the Appellate Body had declared that there is a ‘delicate and carefully negotiated balance in the SPS
Agreement between the shared, but sometimes competing, interests of promoting international trade
and of protecting the life and health of human beings’. Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones,
above n 56, para. 177.
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sources which, at that time, may represent a divergent, but qualified and respected, opinion’.73 In
that regard, one might note the Appellate Body’s statement (given in the context of the SPS
Agreement) that a panel determining whether sufficient scientific evidence exists should ‘bear in
mind that responsible, representative governments commonly act from perspectives of prudence and
precaution where risks of irreversible, e.g. life-terminating, damage to human health are
concerned’.74
B. Paragraph (g) of Article XX
For Article XX(g), three issues have to be addressed: First, is the measure concerned with the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources? Second, is the measure is one ‘relating’ to the
conservation? And third, is the measure made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption?
In US – Shrimp, the measure to safeguard sea turtles was challenged on the grounds that
turtles are not an exhaustible natural resource. Although the Appellate Body could easily have
decided this issue based on GATT precedent where fish had been found to fit within Article XX,75
the appellators instead utilized a teleological approach. Noting that the term ‘exhaustible natural
resources’ in Article XX(g) had been written over 50 years earlier, the Appellate Body proclaimed
that these words ‘must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of the
community of nations about the protection and conservation of the environment’, and, furthermore,
that the term
73

Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, above n 54, para. 178.
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Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, above n 62, para. 124. See William J. Davey,
‘Reflections on the Appellate Body Decision in the Hormones Case and the Meaning of the SPS
Agreement’, in George A. Bermann and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds.) Trade and Human Health and
Safety (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 118–132 at 122-23 (discussing the
precautionary principle).
75

Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, above n 10, para. 131.
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natural resources is not ‘static’ in its content or reference but is rather ‘by
definition, evolutionary’.76
The Appellate Body then pointed to a number of sources, including the mention of sustainable
development and the environment in the WTO’s Preamble, the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea, the Convention on Biological Diversity, Agenda 21, and the Resolution of Assistance to
Developing Countries adopted in conjunction with the Convention on the Conservation of
Migratory Species of Wild Animals.77 Whether these are cited as sources of law, or facts taken
note of (or introduced by) by the Appellate Body, is unclear. Based on this analysis, the Appellate
Body concluded that ‘it is too late in the day to suppose that Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 may
be read as referring only to the conservation of exhaustible mineral or other non-living natural
resources’.78 This was an important Appellate Body decision both for the result reached and the
jurisprudential technique followed.
The Appellate Body did not reach the question of whether the natural resource to be
conserved has to be within the physical territory or legal jurisdiction of the country whose
government is imposing a challenged import ban. Reaching this issue was not necessary because in
US – Shrimp, the endangered turtles were highly migratory. Therefore, the Appellate Body saw a
‘sufficient nexus’ to the United States.79
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Ibid, paras. 129–30 (internal footnote omitted).
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Ibid.
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Ibid, para. 131 (internal footnote omitted). The footnote states that the ‘drafting history does not
demonstrate an intent on the part of the framers of the GATT 1947 to exclude “living” natural
resources from the scope of application of Article XX(g)’. See para. 131 n. 114. My own research
many years ago of the negotiating history led me to include that the conservation of living resources
was not the central purpose of the Article XX(g) exception, but that the drafters had agreed, in a
different context, that fisheries and wildlife could be exhaustible natural resources. See Steve
Charnovitz, ‘Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX’, 25(5) Journal of
World Trade 37 (October 1991), at 45–47.
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Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, above n 10, para. 133.
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Whether in a future dispute involving land-based biodiversity the Appellate Body would see
a sufficient nexus to the country concerned about protecting planetary biodiversity remains to be
seen. Textually, Article XX(g) does not contain any language suggesting that its coverage is
geographically limited. While it is true that the first tuna–dolphin panel held that Article XX(b) and
(g) were not extrajurisdictional,80 that report was not adopted. In my view, it was unfortunate that
the Appellate Body in US – Gasoline chose to take cognizance of this discredited panel report and,
even worse, to bring it into WTO jurisprudence.81 Still, I would be surprised to see a holding that a
WTO Member claiming a GATT Article XX(g) exception is compelled to permit imports of
products made from a foreign endangered species even when such commerce gives incentives for
killing the species. Perhaps the principle of in dubio mitius82 would be helpful to the adjudicator on
the grounds that the governments drafting Article XX did not impose on themselves more onerous
requirements than those specifically mentioned in Article XX.
On the ‘relating to’ prong of the Article XX(g), the Appellate Body in US – Gasoline
seemed to distance itself from the GATT jurisprudence which had given that term a strict meaning
of ‘primarily aimed at’.83 A more nuanced approach was further articulated in US – Shrimp, where
the appellators examined the relationship between the general structure/design of the measure and
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GATT Panel Report, US – Tuna, 1991 (unadopted), above n 50, paras. 5.26, 5.27, 5.32.
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See Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, above n 55, at notes 37–38; Aaditya Mattoo and
Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘Trade, Environment and the WTO: The Dispute Settlement Practice Relating
to Article XX of the GATT’, in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed), International Trade Law and the
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (London: Kluwer Law International, 1997) 327–43 at 327–
332 (criticizing the GATT report in the first tuna-dolphin case).
82

See Appellate Body Report, US – Hormones, above n 62, para. 165 and n 154 (explicating the
principle).
83

Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, above n 55, at 18–19.
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the conservation policy goal it purports to serve.84 Regarding the US import ban on shrimp, the
Appellate Body held that the means were ‘reasonably related’ to the ends.85
The last issue to be considered in adjudicating Article XX(g) is whether the measure is made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. Here the
Appellate Body made two important holdings: One, this prong requires evenhandedness between
regulation of imports and domestic activity.86 Two, while term ‘effective’ does not establish an
empirical effects test, this does not mean that a consideration of ‘the predictable effects of a
measure is never relevant’.87 No further exposition of this point has occurred because there have
not been any Article XX(g) cases since Shrimp. In a thoughtful analysis of the Shrimp compliance
Report, Robert Howse and Damien J. Neven suggest that ‘in future cases, in considering the fit
between a Member’s measure and its environmental objective, the adjudicator should take into
account the relative efficiency of the various policy instruments that a Member may choose to
impose on another Member as a condition of access for its imports’.88
C. The Chapeau of Article XX
The chapeau of Article XX exists as a further condition for recourse to the General
Exceptions. The focus of appraisal by an adjudicator under the standards of the chapeau is how the
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Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, above n 10, paras. 136–137.
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Ibid, para. 141.
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Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, above n 55, at 20–21; Appellate Body Report, US –
Shrimp, above n 10, para. 144.
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Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, above n 55, at 21.

Robert Howse and Damien J. Neven, ‘US – Shrimp. United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia’, in Henrik Horn
and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds), The WTO Case Law of 2001 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003) 41–71 at 66.
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measure is applied, rather than how the measure is designed.89 The evaluation is conducted in the
context of a provisional justification under a specific paragraph in Article XX.90 In the first holding
on this matter, the Appellate Body assigned to the culprit government the burden of proof for the
chapeau.91 To explicate Article XX’s chapeau, the Appellate Body, once again, sought guidance
from the Preamble to the WTO Agreement, and also considered the Uruguay Round Decision on
Trade and Environment.92 Even more remarkably, the Appellate Body declared that in interpreting
the chapeau, it could seek ‘additional interpretive guidance, as appropriate, from the general
principles of international law’.93 In addition, the Appellate Body explained that under general
principles of law and international law, recourse to Article XX must be exercised ‘reasonably’.94
As WTO law commentators, such as Joost Pauwelyn, have pointed out, the Appellate Body
arrogates to itself considerable discretion and adjudicative authority.
A puzzling, and I believe unfortunate, feature of the Appellate Body’s holdings on the
chapeau is the notion that WTO Members have a legal ‘right’ in WTO law to have their exports
accepted by other WTO Members. Given the WTO’s indulgences for antidumping measures, its
policy space for protectionist tariffs and tariff-rate quotas, and the availability in the DSU of
suspension of concessions or other obligations (SCOO) against innocent exporters in the event of
governmental noncompliance, surely no practical right to trade exists under WTO law. Yet for the
89

Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, above n 55, at 22.
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Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, above n 10, para. 120. But see para. 146 regarding the
necessity of considering Article XX(b).
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Appellate Body Report, US –Gasoline, above n 55, at 22–23.
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Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, above n 10, paras. 152–55.
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Ibid, para. 158 (internal footnote omitted that cites to Article 31(c)(3) of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties).
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Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, above n 10, para. 158 (internal footnote omitted that cites to
two treatises and three cases of the International Court of Justice); see also Appellate Body Report,
US –Gasoline, above n 55, at 22 (‘reasonably’).
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most sensitive national policy areas, those covered by Article XX exceptions, the Appellate Body in
US – Gasoline held that Article XX must be applied reasonably with due regard both to the legal
duties of the regulating government ‘and the legal rights of the other parties concerned’.95 But other
than procedural rights, what right does the exporting government have that can be counterpoised to
invocation of an exception? In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body elaborated on this doctrine of
WTO rights. For example, the Appellate Body states that an invocation of an Article XX(g)
exception, if abused, will ‘render naught the substantive treaty rights in, for example, Article XI:1
of other Members’.96 Still, it is one thing to say that an abusive invocation of Article XX is
disallowed, and quite another to say that the Article XI obligation confers an independent right.
Given the myriad trade barriers tolerated WTO law, I would have thought that it is too late in the
day for the Appellate Body to suppose that US trading partners have a legal right97 to export shrimp
to the US economy.
In any event, the Article XX chapeau forbids ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade’. In US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body held that the impugned measure constituted both
unjustifiable discrimination and a disguised restriction. The main problems were that that the US
regulator had not pursued the possibility of entering into cooperative arrangements with the plaintiff
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Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, above n 55, at 22.
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Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, above n 10, para. 156. The point is repeated in para. 159.
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Ibid, paras. 181 (‘negation of rights of Members’), 182 (‘suspension pro hac vice of the treaty
rights of other Members’), 186 (‘rights of other Members’), 163 (‘a right to export shrimp’). At
least in its early years, the Appellate Body seemed to have a statist perception of international trade
as being ‘trade between territorial sovereigns’. Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, above n 55,
at 27.
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countries to mitigate administrative problems, and had not taken into account foreign costs of
compliance.98
Arbitrary discrimination has been further elaborated. In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body
explained that arbitrary discrimination can occur when a defendant government requires
certification of an exporting country, and yet does not give that country a formal opportunity to be
heard, to respond to arguments made against it, and to receive a formal, written, reasoned decision,
and to have a procedure for appeal. Such a program violates the chapeau because it allows arbitrary
discrimination between certified and uncertified countries. An import ban can constitute arbitrary
discrimination when it applies ‘a rigid and unbending standard’ that does not take into consideration
‘different conditions’ in exporting countries.99 In the follow-on case, the Appellate Body upheld a
revised US shrimp regulation that conditioned importation on whether the foreign regulatory
program was comparable in effectiveness to the US program.100
Unjustifiable discrimination has been elaborated in three ways by the Appellate Body in US
– Shrimp. First, the Appellate Body saw such discrimination in the way that the US government
had given one group of countries three years (from 1991 to 1994) to adjust to US turtle safety
measures, while giving the complaining countries less four months to adjust in 1995–96.101 Oddly
though, the Appellate Body did not explain why a phase-in period in 1995 had to be as long as one
in 1991. Nor did the Appellate Body attempt to reconcile its objection with the post-1997
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Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, above n 55, at 27–28. In a broader Article XX context in
a later case, the Appellate Body criticized the regulating government for shifting the costs of
enforcement to imported goods instead of evenly distributing such costs between domestic and
imported products. Appellate Body Report, Korea – Beef, above n 65, para. 181.
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Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, above n 10, paras. 163–164, 177. Such a situation can also
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subsequent practice of WTO Members of not automatically granting countries that join the WTO
(through accession) the benefit of the phase-ins prescribed in the WTO Agreement. The second
instance of unjustifiable discrimination occurred when US regulators negotiated cooperative
agreements on sea turtle conservation with some countries, but did not attempt to do so with the
complaining countries.102 The Appellate Body postulated that the need for such environmental
cooperation was recognized internally in the WTO in the Uruguay Round Decision on Trade and
Environment and the 1996 Report of the CTE, and in addition was also recognized in Agenda 21,
the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory
Species of Wild Animals. The Appellate Body did not explain exactly the relevance under the
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties of these two environmental Conventions, particularly in
light of the fact that the defendant United States is not a party to either of them.103 The third
instance of discrimination occurred when US regulators devoted less efforts to technology transfer
to the complaining countries than to some other countries.104 This holding is the only one I am
aware of in WTO jurisprudence that applies an MFN-like requirement to subsidies.
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international agreement).
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Boat”?’, in Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel
Trade Governance and Social Regulation (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006) 199–227 at 215 (noting
that the Appellate Body’s reference to treaties raises questions of legitimacy and state consent). In
EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, the panel stated that following Article 31(c)(3)
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties did not require the panel to consider as a rule of
international law, treaties that are not applicable between all the parties to the dispute. Panel
Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, adopted 21 November 2006, paras. 7.70–
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MEAs as to what would happen if a defendant government cited an MEA for justification that had
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The Appellate Body did not appear to consider whether the complaining governments in the
shrimp-turtle dispute had made any significant efforts to safeguard sea turtles (or to negotiate with
the United States). Contrary to what the Appellate Body suggested in calling the US law a
‘weapon’,105 one might instead perceive the US import ban as a shield and the practices in the
complaining countries that killed endangered sea turtles as the weapon. Although the WTO law
appears to lack principles of estoppel, the Appellate Body has suggested that sovereign states
‘should’ act together within the WTO ‘or in other international fora, to protect endangered species
or to otherwise protect the environment’.106 Whether the appellators will someday insist that a
complainant government do so remains to be seen.
III. CONCLUSION
An appropriate closing for a contribution to a first-decade anniversary symposium is to make
predictions about the next decade. I believe that a new cycle has begun in international governance
that will be characterized by greater attention to the environment. These concerns will continue to
influence the development of international economic law, and the advances on environment in the
WTO wrought by the Appellate Body will not be reversed. The Doha Development Round will
eventually be completed in some form, and the new package of WTO amendments will include
some significant environmental provisions. The next decade may also bring more trade disputes
regarding the environment on knotty issues such as government-created marketable rights to
address climate change, biofuels production on deforested land, and genetically modified
agriculture. One hopes that the WTO will be up to these challenges, and that it will get better at
working with other international institutions to achieve more effective global governance.
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Ibid, para. 185. The Appellate Body has also suggested that the good faith notion applies to all
Members, not just a plaintiff. Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), above
n 12, para. 134 n 97.
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